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Abstract
Agreement protocols have been typically deployed at small
scale, e.g., using three to ve machines. is is because these
protocols seem to suer from a sharp performance decay.
More specically, as the size of a deployment—i.e., degree
of replication—increases, the protocol performance greatly
decreases. ere is not much experimental evidence for this
decay in practice, however, notably for larger system sizes,
e.g., beyond a handful of machines.
In this paper we execute agreement protocols on up to
100 machines and observe on their performance decay. We
consider well-known agreement protocols part of mature
systems, such as Apache ZooKeeper, etcd, and BFT-Smart,
as well as a chain and a novel ring-based agreement protocol
which we implement ourselves.
We provide empirical evidence that current agreement
protocols execute gracefully on 100 machines. We observe
that throughput decay is initially sharp (consistent with pre-
vious observations); but intriguingly—as each system grows
beyond a few tens of replicas—the decay dampens. For chain-
and ring-based replication, this decay is slower than for the
other systems. e positive takeaway from our evaluation
is that mature agreement protocol implementations can sus-
tain out-of-the-box 300 to 500 requests per second when exe-
cuting on 100 replicas on a wide-area public cloud platform.
Chain- and ring-based replication can reach between 4K
and 11K (up to 20x improvements) depending on the fault
assumptions.
1 Introduction
An agreement (or consensus) protocol [27, 51] allows nodes
in a distributed system to agree on every action they take,
and hence maintain their state consistently. Agreement pro-
tocols are essential for providing strong consistency, or lin-
earizability [40], in distributed systems, and such protocols
are able to withstand even arbitrary (i.e., Byzantine) fail-
ures [19, 53].
∗Authors appear in alphabetical order.
According to distributed systems folklore, agreement pro-
tocols are too expensive if deployed on more than a hand-
ful of machines [16, 24, 35, 41]. Indeed, there is a tradeo
between performance and fault-tolerance, and some perfor-
mance decay is inherent in strongly-consistent systems [1].
When growing in size, such a system can tolerate more
faults—but performance does not scale accordingly. is
is because the system replicas (more precisely, a quorum of
them) must agree on every operation. Hence, as the number
of machines increases, the cost for agreement increases.
A few workarounds exist to deal with this performance
decay. First, some systems ensure strong consistency for
only a small, critical subset of their state (e.g., congura-
tion), while the rest of the system has a scalable design
under weaker guarantees [4, 31, 74]. e critical part of
the system builds on mature agreement protocols such as
ZooKeeper [41], etcd [65, 62], Consul [59], or Boxwood [55].
A second workaround is sharding [33, 3]. In this case, the
service state is broken down into disjoint shards, each shard
running as a separate agreement cluster [16, 23]. Additional
mechanism for cross-shard coordination, such as 2PC [13],
ensures that the whole system stays consistent.
Yet a third workaround consists in abandoning strong con-
sistency, eschewing agreement protocols [18, 85]. Avoiding
agreement protocols is sometimes possible for certain data
types, e.g., CRDTs [6, 26, 39, 76]. But for solving certain
problems, notably general state machine replication (SMR),
databases, or smart contracts, an agreement building block
is necessary [23, 36, 79].
Briey, the purpose of these workarounds is to avoid exe-
cuting agreement at a larger scale. Consequently, agreement
protocols have almost never been deployed, in practice, on
more than a few machines, typically three to ve [23]. To-
day there is not much empirical evidence of their through-
put decay. For instance, we do not know how ZooKeeper or
PBFT [19] perform with, say, 100 machines. In fact, anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that agreement protocols oen do not
work altogether beyond a few machines [22, 34, 79].
is question—of performance decay for agreement
protocols—is not only of academic interest. For example,
agreement protocols are important in decentralized services:
they stand at the heart of distributed ledger applications in1
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permissioned environments [11, 79]. For these applications,
SMR protocols are expected to run on at least a few tens of
machines [25, 86]. Another example is in a sharded design:
under the Byzantine fault-tolerance model, shards cannot
be too small, otherwise an adversary can easily compromise
the whole system. In this case, it is critical for each shard to
comprise tens or hundreds of machines [49, 35]. But agree-
ment protocols struggle from the “they do not scale” stigma
and the lack of experiments around their performance decay.
In this chapter we address the void in the literature by
deploying and observing how the size of a system (execut-
ing agreement) impacts its performance. We focus on SMR
systems, since agreement protocols most commonly appear
in such systems. Our primary goal is to obtain empirical evi-
dence of how SMR performance decays in practice at larger
size, and hopefully allay some of the skepticism around the
ability of such systems to execute across tens or hundreds of
replicas (i.e., machines). We deploy and evaluate ve SMR
systems on up to 100 replicas and report on our results.
e rst three systems we study are well-known SMR
implementations: ZooKeeper [41] and etcd [65], which are
crash fault-tolerant (CFT), and BFT-Smart [15], which is
Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT). Consistently with previous
observations [16, 24, 41], we observe that their throughput
decays sharply at small scale. e interesting part is that
this sharp decay does not persist. Overall their throughput
follows an inversely proportional decay rate, and through-
put decay dampens as systems get larger, e.g., beyond ∼40
replicas.
ZooKeeper, etcd, and BFT-Smart execute most eciently—
obtain best performance—when deployed at their smallest
size, i.e., running on 3 replicas (4 for BFT-Smart). rough-
put drops to 50% of its best value at 11 replicas. When run-
ning on 50 replicas, the throughput decays to almost 10%.
On 100 replicas the throughput drops to roughly 6% of its
best value. In absolute numbers, these systems sustain 300
to 500 rps (requests per second) at 100 replicas on modest
hardware in a public cloud platform. e average latency is
below 3.5s, while the 99th percentile is 6.5s, even for BFT.
ese three systems are hardened SMR implementations
and we choose them for their maturity. We complement the
performance observations with a stability study. Briey, we
seek to understand whether these systems are capable to
function despite faults at large scale. More precisely, we in-
ject a fault in their primary (i.e., leader) replica and evaluate
their ability to recover. We nd that ZooKeeper recovers
excellently (in a few seconds), indicating that this system
can perform predictably at scale, for instance to implement
a replicated system across hundreds of nodes. e other two
systems are slower to recover or have diculties doing so
at 100 replicas.
e fourth system we investigate is Chain, based on chain
replication [84]. is system is throughput-optimized, so it
helps us delineate the ideal case, namely, a throughput upper
bound. When growing from 3 to 100 replicas, throughput
in Chain decays very slowly, from 15k rps to 11k rps (i.e., to
73% of its best value). If we place replicas carefully on the
wide-area network so as to minimize chain traversal time,
Chain exhibits below 3 seconds latency.
It can be misleading, however, to praise chain replication
as the ideal agreement protocol. Chain does not suer from
performance decay as severely as others, indeed—but only
in graceful executions (i.e., failure-free and synchronous net-
work). In non-graceful runs, throughput drops to zero. is
protocol sacrices availability, because it must recongure
(pausing execution) to remove any faulty replica [84]. is
system relies on a synchronous model with fail-stop faults,
a strong assumption. Worse still, the chain is as ecient
as its weakest link, so a single straggler can drag down the
performance of the whole system.
e h system employs a ring overlay (a chain gener-
alization). We call this system Carousel, and we design it
ourselves. In contrast to Chain, this system does not pause
execution for reconguration, maintaining availability de-
spite asynchrony or faults.
Unlike prior solutions, Carousel does not rely on recon-
guration [84, 82] nor a classic broadcast mode [12, 47] for
masking faults or asynchrony. Doing so would incur down-
time and hurt performance. Instead, we take the following
approach: Each replica keeps fallback (i.e., redundant) con-
nections to other replicas. When faulty replicas prevent (or
slow down) progress, a correct replica can activate its fall-
back path(s) to restore progress and maintain availability.
e goal of this simple mechanism in Carousel is to selec-
tively bypass faults or stragglers on the ring topology (pre-
serving good throughput).
To the best of our knowledge, Carousel is the rst ring-
based system to preserve its topology (and availability) de-
spite active faults. In a 106-nodes system, Carousel sustains
6k ops/sec when there are no faults (throughput decay to
55% of its best value). If F = 21 replicas manifest malicious
behavior, then throughput reaches 4k ops/sec (48% decay).
Since Carousel and Chain are research prototypes, we do
not evaluate their stability, which we leave for future work.
To summarize, in this paper we investigate how perfor-
mance decays in agreement protocols when increasing their
size. We deploy ve SMR systems using at least 100 repli-
cas in a geo-replicated network. We observe that, indeed,
throughput decays in these systems as a function of system
size, but this decay dampens. Our experiments with chain-
and ring-replication show that there are ways to alleviate
throughput decay in SMR, informing future designs.
In the rest of this paper, we provide some background,
including the SMR systems under our study (§2), and then
discuss the methodology of our empirical evaluation (§3).
Next, we present the results of our evaluation on the per-
formance decay of ve SMR systems (§4). We take a rather
unconventional approach of presenting rst the evaluation2
of Carousel (in §4), and then present its design (§5). We also
discuss related work (§6), and then conclude (§7).
2 Background & Motivation
Consensus protocols oen employ a layered design. In Paxos
terminology, for instance, there is a distinction between
proposers, acceptors, and learners (or observers) [83]. Pro-
posers and acceptors eectively handle the agreement pro-
tocol, while learners handle the execution of operations (i.e.,
client requests).
We are interested in the agreement protocol. is is the
one typically encountering scalability issues. As mentioned
earlier, agreement should ideally execute on tens or hun-
dreds of replicas in certain applications, e.g., for decentral-
ized services, or to ensure that shards are resilient against a
Byzantine adversary [25, 49, 35, 86].
When increasing the size of a system executing agree-
ment, some performance degradation is unavoidable. is
is inherent to replicated systems that ensure strong con-
sistency, because a higher degree of replication (i.e., fault-
tolerance) entails a bigger overhead to agree on each request.
But how does performance decay—in a linear manner? Or
does the decay worsen or does it lessen when system size
increases? Both throughput and latency are vital measures
of performance, and it is well known that these two are at
odds with each other in SMR systems [38, 52]. In this paper
we focus on throughput, but our study also covers latency
results.
We focus on systems with deterministic guarantees. ere
is a growing body of work proposing agreement proto-
cols for very large systems. Most of this work, however,
oers probabilistic guarantees, e.g., systems designed for
cryptocurrencies [28, 32, 49], or group communication [35].
ese probabilistic solutions oen employ a commiee-
based design, where a certain subset of nodes executes agree-
ment on behalf of the whole system. e protocol which this
subset of nodes typically execute is, in fact, a deterministic
agreement algorithm. is can be seen most clearly, for in-
stance, in distributed ledger systems such as ByzCoin [48] or
Bitcoin-NG [28], where the chosen commiee runs a PBFT-
like algorithm [19].
2.1 SMR Systems in Our Study
Our study covers ve representative SMR protocols. We
give an overview of these system in Table 1, highlighting
some of their essential dierences. As can be seen, these
systems cover two types of synchrony models (partially syn-
chronous, and synchronous), two fault models (crash and
Byzantine), and there are three classes of communication
paerns (leader-centric, chain, and ring topology).
In terms of message complexity at the boleneck node, in
the rst three protocols the leader does two or three rounds
of broadcast. In Chain and Carousel the load is equally
distributed across all replicas: in Chain each replica sends
exactly one message per request, whereas each replica in
Carousel processes N+1 messages per request. Finally, the
message delays row include communication to and from
client. To sum-up, these ve systems cover a wide range
of design choices. We now discuss each system in more de-
tail.
ZooKeeper. is system is based on ZAB, an atomic
broadcast algorithm [45], and is implemented in Java. We
study ZooKeeper rather than ZAB directly, as ZAB is tightly
integrated inside ZooKeeper.
etcd. is system is implemented in Go and is based on the
Ra consensus algorithm [62]. ZAB and Ra share many de-
sign points [61]. A central feature in both is the existence of a
leader replica which guides the agreement protocol through
a series of broadcast-based rounds. As our experiments will
show, these two systems experience very similar throughput
decay (§4).
ZooKeeper and etcd are widely used in production and are
actively maintained. ey have found adoption both in clus-
ter and multi-datacenter (WAN) environments [66, 9, 14, 30].
CFT SMR protocols are also relevant to implementing decen-
tralized trust, e.g., in a blockchain. For instance, a version
of Hyperledger Fabric uses Apache Kaa as a CFT consen-
sus algorithm [71]. ese two CFT protocols are interesting
in their own right, not necessarily in blockchains, and can
also indicate how SMR performs in certain variants of the
Byzantine fault model (e.g., XFT model [54]).
BFT-Smart. e third system we study, implemented in
Java, provides BFT guarantees [15]. BFT-Smart is actively
used and has been maintained by a team of developers for
over eight years, being a default choice for prototyping re-
search algorithms in several groups [63, 54, 73]. BFT-Smart
is paerned aer the seminal PBFT consensus algorithm of
Castro and Liskov [19].
ese three systems described so far employ a leader-
centric design [17, 61], i.e., they rely on the leader replica to
carry most of the burden in the agreement protocol. Speci-
cally, the leader does not only establish a total-order across
operations, but also disseminates (via broadcast) those op-
erations to all replicas. is design simplies the SMR algo-
rithm [61]. e disadvantage is that the leader replica (its
CPU or bandwidth) is typically the boleneck [45].
We choose these three systems for their maturity. ese
are production-ready (ZooKeeper and etcd) or seasoned im-
plementations (BFT-Smart). We also study the stability of
these three systems, i.e., executions where the leader replica
crashes, in addition to their performance. Prototypes, like
the next two systems we consider, may deliver beer per-3
Table 1: Overview of the SMR systems in our study. ∗With the tentative execution optimization [19, 78]. †is is the worst-case delay, but
depending on which replica receives the client request, the message delay can be as low as N + 2 (as we explain later §5).
ZooKeeper (ZAB [45]) etcd (Ra [61]) BFT-Smart [15] Chain [84] Carousel (§5)
Synchrony assumptions partial sync. partial sync. partial sync. sync. partial sync.
Fault model; system size N crash; 2F+1 crash; 2F+1 Byzantine; 3F+1 crash; F+1 Byzantine; 5F+1
Communication paern (overlay) leader-centric leader-centric leader-centric chain ring
Msg. processed by boleneck node ∼3N ∼3N ∼4N 1 N + 1
One-way message delays 4 4 4∗ N + 2 2N + 2†
formance, but oen do so without vital production-relevant
features which can hamper performance.
e fourth and h SMR systems we wrote ourselves:
Chain, our prototype of chain replication [84], and Carousel,
a new ring-based replication protocol with BFT guarantees.
Both are wrien in Go. Chain replication, and in particular
its ring-based variants, are provably throughput-optimal in
uniform networks [37, 44]. 1 In contrast to leader-centric
protocols, these systems avoid the boleneck at the leader
because they balance the burden of disseminating operations
across multiple system replicas.
Chain. We use this system as a baseline, to obtain an ideal
upper bound—and what other SMR systems could aim for—
both in terms of absolute throughput and throughput decay.
We faithfully implement the common-case with pipelining
and batching, to optimize performance [61, 75].
Chain works in a fail-stop model, i.e., assumes synchrony
to be able to mask crash faults [84], unlike the other four
systems we study in this paper. Solutions to make chain- or
ring-based systems fault-tolerant include an external recon-
guration module, or a special recovery mode [12, 3, 47, 82].
In such solutions, even simple crashes put the system in a
degraded mode, possibly for extended periods of time.
Carousel. is system represents our eort in design-
ing a BFT protocol optimized for throughput, which can
withstand sub-optimal conditions (e.g., faults, asynchrony)
and hence oer improved availability. We briey describe
Carousel below, and additionally dedicate a section for full
details (§5).
Carousel is a ring-based agreement protocol assuming par-
tial synchrony. When a fault occurs, we mask this by tem-
porarily increasing the fanout at a particular replica. is
is in contrast to prior ring or chain designs, which resort to
reconguration or recovery.
By default, every replica in Carousel has a fanout of 1, i.e.,
it forwards everything it receives to its immediate successor
on ring. In the worst case, F consecutive replicas on the ring
can be faulty. In this case, the predecessor of all these nodes
(a correct replica) increases its fanout to F +1, bypassing all
1As we discuss later (§4 and §6), the WAN testbed we use is not uniform,
yet these systems show very good performance.
MON TOR DAL SEA SJC HOU MEX SAO
WDC 15 22 31 56 60 39 56 115
MON 9 38 61 64 43 63 123
TOR 30 53 56 37 55 124
DAL 40 36 8 25 143
SEA 18 48 65 174
SJC 44 56 195
HOU 30 136
MEX 167
Table 2: Inter-regional RTT (msec) in SoLayer. e nine regions
are: Washington (WDC), Montreal (MON), Toronto (TOR), Dallas
(DAL), Seale (SEA), San Jose (SJC), Houston (HOU), Mexico
(MEX), and Sao Paolo (SAO).
F faults. is way, the successor of these faulty nodes still
receives all updates propagating on the ring, and progress is
not interrupted. e system throughput deteriorates when
this happens, but not as badly as that of broadcast-based so-
lutions, where one of the replicas—the leader—has a fanout
of 2F + 1 (or 3F + 1 for BFT) [19, 41].
3 Methodology
We now discuss the testbed for our study (§3.1), details of
the write-only workload (§3.2), as well as the workload suite
we use to conduct experiments (§3.3).
3.1 Testbeds
We consider as testbed the SoLayer public cloud platform
spanning multiple datacenters [68]. We use virtual machines
(VMs) equipped with 2 (virtual) CPU cores and 4GB RAM.
We use low spec-ed VMs to gain insight in SMR scalability
on commodity hardware. Each client and replica executes
in a separate VM. is separation avoids unnecessary noise
in our results, which would happen if client and/or replica
processes were contending for local resources.
Network. e bandwidth available between dierent
nodes, either clients or replicas, is not a boleneck: every
VM has 100Mbps bandwidth. Latencies in SoLayer range
from under 10ms to almost 200ms, depending on distance;
we consider nine regions of North, Central, and South Amer-
ica. We use ping to measure the inter-regional latencies
(which are symmetric), and present our results in Table 2.4
Node placement. As Table 2 illustrates, there is a large
disparity in cross-regional latencies. Consequently, replica
and client placement across regions can impact performance.
By default, we always place all clients in Washington.
Spreading clients randomly has no benet, and would intro-
duce unnecessary variability in the results. For ZooKeeper,
etcd, and BFT-Smart, we place replicas randomly across the
nine regions.
Replica placement is particularly important for chain- or
ring-based systems. For instance, in Chain, client requests
propagate from one replica to another, starting from the
head of the chain until it reaches the tail; the tail responds
to clients. If we distribute replicas randomly, then requests
will pass back and forth between regions, accumulating la-
tencies on the order of seconds or worse. Random replica
placement would be unreasonable. Instead, successive nodes
in the chain should be clustered in the same region, and the
jumps across regions should be minimized: i.e., the latency
for traversing the chain should be minimal (intuitively, this
corresponds to solving the traveling salesman problem).
We take a simple approach to replica placement for Chain
and Carousel. We start with Washington, and then traverse
the continent from East to West and North to South—i.e.,
counter-clockwise, as follows: (1) Washington, (2) Montreal,
(3) Toronto, (4) Dallas, (5) Seale, (6) San Jose, (7) Houston,
(8) Mexico, and (9) Sao Paolo. Each region hosts a random
number of replicas between 8 and 12. While this is not the
optimal placement method, it is simple and yields surpris-
ingly good results (§4.1). More complex alternatives exist
to our heuristic-based solution, typically based on integer
programming [88], or iterative optimization algorithms [5].
To conclude, this multi-datacenter deployment mimics a
real-world global deployment, where each datacenter is ef-
fectively a city (with intra-city latencies being negligible).
is is a standard experimental setup [32, 81, 34]. Note that
placing clients in Washington does not give any advantage
to Chain and Carousel, since each client request has to tra-
verse the whole chain (or ring).
Operating system and soware. All machines in our
study run Ubuntu 14.04.1x64. For Apache ZooKeeper, we
use v3.4.5 [70]. We install etcd v2.3.7 directly from its repos-
itory, and BFT-Smart v1.2 [64].
3.2 Workload Characteristics
e goal of our workload is to stress the central part of the
systems under study—their underlying agreement protocol,
which is typically their boleneck. In practice, this protocol
is also in charge of replicating the request data (i.e., blocks
of transactions) to all replicas. Clients produce a workload
consisting of write-only requests, i.e., we avoid read-only
optimization such as leases [20]. Each request has 250 bytes
(inspired from a Bitcoin workload [25]).
Local Handling of Requests. Requests are opaque val-
ues which replicas do not interpret, consisting of a constant
string. e execution step consists of simply storing the
data of each request in memory. Recall that our main goal
is to nd how system size inuences throughput decay. For
this reason, it is desirable to exclude features that are inde-
pendent of system size, which typically would incur a xed
overhead (or amortization, in the case of batching). Such
features (e.g., persistence layer, execution) are application-
dependent, are oen embarrassingly parallel, and moreover
optimizations at this level [46] are orthogonal to our study.
For ZooKeeper and etcd, we mount a tmpfs lesystem
and congure these systems to write requests to this device.
In BFT-Smart we handle requests via a callback, which ap-
pends every request to an in-memory linked list. Chain and
Carousel simply log each request to an in-memory slice (i.e.,
array).
Batching. We do not optimize the batching conguration.
is is because dierent system sizes require dierent batch
sizes to optimize throughput [58]. Moreover, batching is of-
ten an implementation detail hidden from users, e.g., etcd
hardcodes the batch size to 1MB [67]. Similarly, batching
in ZooKeeper is not congurable; this system processes re-
quests individually, and it is unclear whether batching is
handled entirely at the underlying network layer (Ney). In
BFT-Smart we use batches of 400, the default. In Chain and
Carousel we are more conservative, allowing up to 10 re-
quests per batch, since these systems are already throughput-
optimized in their dissemination scheme.
It is well-known that batching aects the absolute
throughput of a system. We are primarily interested, how-
ever, by the throughput decay function of SMR systems, and
not to maximize absolute throughput numbers. Prior work
has shown that batching does not aect the throughput de-
cay, e.g., in BFT SMR systems [24]. For this reason, we expect
that the throughput decay in each system evolves indepen-
dently of batch size.
3.3 Workload Suite
Our workload suite has two parts. We use (1) a workload
generator that creates requests and handles the communi-
cation of each client with the service. We also use (2) a set
of scripts to coordinate the workload across all clients and
control the service-side (e.g., restart service between sub-
sequent experiments). e workload generator diers for
every SMR system, since each system has a dierent API.
e coordinating side is a common part which we reuse.
e main components of the workload genera-
tor are a client-side library, which abstracts over
the target system, and a thread pool, e.g., using
the multiprocessing.Pool package in Python, or
java.util.concurrent.Executors in Java. e thread5
pool instantiates parallel workload generators from a
given client node. For each of ZooKeeper, etcd, Chain,
and Carousel, we implement the workload generator in a
Python script. BFT-Smart is bundled with a Java client-side
library; accordingly, for this system, we write the workload
generator in Java.
As mentioned earlier, all client nodes are placed in the
same region: Washington. We use 10 VMs, each hosting a
client, and each client runs the workload generator instan-
tiated with a predened number of threads. Depending on
the target system and its size, we use between 10 and 180
threads per client to saturate the system and reach peak
throughput. Beside the number of threads, the workload
generator accepts a few other parameters, notably, the IP
and port of a system replica (this is the leader in ZooKeeper,
etcd, or BFT-Smart; the head of the chain for Chain; or a
random replica for Carousel); the experiment duration (30
seconds by default); or the size of a request (250 bytes in our
case).
It is important that clients synchronize their actions. For
instance, client threads should coordinate to start simulta-
neously. Also, we restart and clean-up the service of each
system aer each experiment, and we also gather statistics
and logs. e scripts for achieving this are common among
all systems. We use GNU parallel [80] and ssh to coordi-
nate the actions of all the clients. To control the service-side,
we use the Upstart infrastructure [69].
4 Performance Decay Study
We now present our observations on the performance decay
of ve SMR protocols. We break this section in two parts:
performance (§4.1) and stability results (§4.2).
As mentioned before, we use 10 clients, each running mul-
tiple workload threads. Upon connecting to a system replica,
clients allow for a 20 seconds respite to ensure all connec-
tions establish correctly. en all client threads begin the
same workload. Each execution runs for 30 seconds (exclud-
ing a warm-up and cool-down time of 15 seconds each) and
each point in the performance results is the average of 3 ex-
ecutions. For stability experiments we use executions of 60
seconds, with a maximum of up to 120 seconds.
4.1 Performance of SMR at 100+ Replicas
We rst discuss throughput (§4.1.1), and then latency
(§4.1.2).
4.1.1 roughput
We report on the peak throughput value, i.e., throughput
when the system begins to saturate, before latencies surge,
in requests per second (rps). We compute this as the sum
of the throughput across all 10 clients. We also plot the
standard deviation, though oen this is negligible and not
visible in plots. Figure 1 presents our results. For readability,
we also indicate throughput values on most data points.
ZooKeeper, etcd, and BFT-Smart. For ZooKeeper and
etcd, which are CFT, we start from a minimum of 3 repli-
cas and then grow each system in increments of 4 until we
reach 101 replicas. For BFT-Smart, we start from 4 replicas—
the minimum conguration which oers fault-tolerance in
a BFT system—and we use increments of 6 replicas up to
N = 100. Since we use dierent increments and start
from dierent system sizes, the x-axes in Figure 1 dier
slightly across these systems. In terms of fault thresholds,
F = bN−12 c = 50 for CFT systems, and F = bN−13 c = 33
for BFT-Smart.
Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that running
agreement with more than a few replicas should be avoided.
Every additional replica participates in the consensus al-
gorithm, inating the complexity. is complexity, e.g., is
quadratic in the number of replicas for BFT systems [24, 35],
raising the belief that SMR deployments should always stay
small in their “comfort zone.”
Prior ndings on throughput decay are scarce and at small
scale; briey, these suggest that leader-centric protocols de-
cay very sharply, e.g., up to N ≈ 20 [15, 24, 41], and con-
sequently should be avoided. For instance, throughput in
a LAN deployment of ZooKeeper shows that each increase
by 2 in system size incurs a decay by at least 5K rps (and
up to 15K) [41, §5.1]. e same ndings are echoed in ex-
periments with PBFT on a LAN [1, §4.2] or the wide-area
network [58, §5.2]. Under a sustained sharp decay, through-
put would drop to 0 before reaching a few tens of replicas.
Our ndings complement earlier observations at smaller
scale. Consistent with previous ndings, we observe
from Figure 1 that the sharpest decline in throughput is at
small system sizes. What happens, however, is that the decay
trend tapers o. Notably from 20 replicas onward, through-
put decays more and more gracefully.
Upon closer inspection, throughput decays at a non-linear
rate, roughly inversely proportional to system size N . Ana-
lytically, the slopes for leader-centric systems approximate a
O(1/N) function. ese ndings conrm an intuitive under-
standing of these protocols. As discussed, ZooKeeper, etcd,
and BFT-Smart are leader-centric protocols. e leader has
a certain (xed) processing capacity, say C , equally divided
among the other system nodes, yielding a C/N decay rate.
ese systems are bound by the capacity C at the leader—
typically CPU or bandwidth. In our case, WAN links are not
saturated; these systems are bound by leader CPU, since we
use relatively small VMs [41, 43].
roughput decay dampens as we grow each system be-
cause every additional replica incurs an amount of work de-
pending on the current system size: adding a replica when
N=3 is more costly than adding a replica when N=100,6
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Figure 1: roughput decay for ve SMR systems on a public wide-area cloud platform. For enhanced visibility, we use separate graphs for
each system. We also indicate actual throughput values alongside data points. Notice the dierent axes.
given that there are some xed processing overheads at the
primary which get amortized with system size. We also note
that in a larger system there are more tasks (such as broad-
cast) executing in parallel. Finally and most importantly
perhaps, throughput saturates at higher latencies when the
systems are larger (see §4.1.2), since the processing pipeline
depends on more replicas, i.e., as each system grows, there
is a tendency to trade latency for throughput.
We observe that absolute throughput numbers at 100 repli-
cas are in the same ballpark for these three SMR systems,
ranging from 311 to 490 rps. As a side note, this is 45− 70x
the current peak theoretical throughput of Bitcoin, suggest-
ing that we can use SMR eectively in mid-sized blockchains,
e.g., 100 replicas. If we extrapolate from our observation on
the decay rate, it follows that these systems can match Bit-
coin peak throughput at about 4500− 6700 replicas. is is
an interesting observation, as the Bitcoin network has about
the same size (circa late 2016 [25]). We interpret this as a
7
simple coincidence, however.
Interestingly, BFT-Smart almost matches the performance
of its CFT counterparts. is suggests that BFT SMR pro-
tocols scale relatively as well as CFT protocols, regardless
of typical quadratic communication complexity of BFT. All
three systems were surprisingly stable when running at
scale, showing consistent results and consequently the stan-
dard deviations bars are oen imperceptible in our plots.
Chain. We deploy Chain using the node placement heuris-
tic presented earlier (§3.1). e throughput evolution results
for this system are in the fourth row of Figure 1; please note
the y-axis range. As expected, Chain preserves its through-
put very well with increasing system size [12]. So long as
the system stays uniform—i.e., without reducing replica com-
puting performance or bandwidth—the throughput degrades
very slowly and at a linear rate. At N = 101, the system
sustains 73% of the throughput it can deliver when N = 3.
is is not entirely surprising, as adding replicas to Chain
does not increase the load on any single node (in the rst
order of approximation), including the leader (i.e., the head
replica).
To conclude, chain replication maintains throughput ex-
ceptionally well. is system, however, sacrices availability
in the face of faults or asynchrony. Additionally, the chain is
as ecient as its weakest link. Indeed, we repeatedly encoun-
tered in our experiments cases with zero throughput. Most
oen, this happened due to a replica crashing, but also in a
few cases due to misconguration of a successor, therefore
leaving the tail node unreachable.
Carousel. is ring-based system can maintain availabil-
ity despite faulty (or straggler) nodes. Accordingly, we have
two measurements: (1) a common case showing the through-
put during well-behaved executions, and (2) a sub-optimal
(faulty) case when F faults manifest. Since Carousel toler-
ates up to one-h faulty replicas [56], we set F = 21. e
faulty replicas occupy successive positions on the ring topol-
ogy, and collaboratively they aim to create a boleneck in
the system. ey do so by activating fallback paths on the
ring structure. Concretely, they request from the same cor-
rect replica—the target—to accept trac from each of them
and pass that trac forward on the ring. e target is the
successor of the last faulty node. To make maers worse, the
target is also the leader replica (we call this the sequencer,
described in §5.1). We note that faulty replicas might as well
stop propagating updates; but this has a lesser impact on
throughput, as the target node would need not process the
messages from all faulty nodes. is scenario is among the
worst that can happen in terms of throughput degradation
to Carousel, barring a full-edged DDoS aack or a crashed
leader (in the laer case progress would halt in any leader-
based SMR algorithm).
e results are in the h row of Figure 1. e through-
put decays similarly in the good and faulty cases; in absolute
numbers there is a dierence of ∼3K rps at every system
size. Another way to look at it is that faulty nodes cause
on average 30% loss in throughput. Carousel degrades less
gracefully than Chain, as it includes additional BFT mecha-
nism (§5.1). Nevertheless, the decay rate in Carousel follows
a linear rate, and comes within 60% of Chain throughput
(which we regard as ideal, assuming fault-free executions).
In contrast to leader-centric solutions, the chain- and ring-
replication systems avoid the boleneck at the leader and,
as expected, exhibit less throughput decay, having more ef-
cient dissemination overlays.
4.1.2 Latency
For latency, we report on the average latency at peak
throughput, as observed by one of the clients. Since all
clients reside in Washington and connect to the same replica,
they experience similar latencies. e exception to this is
in Carousel, where clients connect to random replicas of
the system; to be fair, we present the latency of a client
connecting to a replica in Washington. e results for all
ve systems are in Figure 2. At small scale, CFT systems
(ZooKeeper and etcd) exhibit latencies on the order of tens
of milliseconds. In contrast, BFT-Smart entails an additional
phase (round-trip) in the agreement protocol for every re-
quest, which translates into higher latencies; batching, how-
ever, helps compensate for this additional phase in terms of
throughput.
We remark on the high latency of Chain. is is to be
expected, since this system trades throughput for latency,
but it is also amplied by an implementation detail. Specif-
ically, each client runs an HTTP server, waiting for replies
from the tail (a distant replica in Sao Paolo). e server is
based on the cherrypy framework (wrien in Python, and
unoptimized). At low load, the latency in Chain is similar to
Carousel. But in Chain clients create a larger volume of re-
quests to saturate the system and also run the HTTP server,
elevating the load and latency on each client. (In fact, in an
earlier version of Chain, clients were the boleneck.)
e average latency across all SMR systems does not sur-
pass 3.5 seconds. We only include the latency for the good
case of Carousel, but even in the faulty case, latency does
not exceed 3.2s. In terms of 99th percentiles, the worst cases
are 6.5s for BFT-Smart (N = 100), and 6s for the faulty-case
of Carousel (N = 107).
4.2 Stability experiments
Our goal here is to evaluate if mature SMR systems re-
cover eciently from a serious fault when running at large
scale. Concretely, we crash the leader replica (triggering
the leader-change protocol) and measure the impact this has8
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(N = 101), as well as for BFT-Smart (N = 100).
on throughput. We cover ZooKeeper, etcd, and BFT-Smart;
the other systems (Chain and Carousel) have no recovery
implemented.
When the leader in an SMR system crashes, this kicks
o an election algorithm to choose a new leader. We study
the stability of this algorithm—whether it works at scale and
how much time it requires. ese tests are rather about the
code maturity in these systems rather than their algorithmic
advantages. Our results are in Figure 3, describing two runs:
(1) a healthy case, and (2) a case where we crash the leader
(i.e., primary). During the rst 20s clients simply wait, and
then they start their workload; we crash the leader 20s later.
e point where we crash the leader is obvious, around 40s,
as the throughput drops instantly to zero.
ZooKeeper has consistently the fastest recovery. e
throughput reaches its peak within just a few seconds af-
ter the leader crashes, consistent with earlier ndings at
smaller scale [77]. is system has an optimization so that
the new leader is a replica with the most up-to-date state,
which partly accounts for fast recovery [61]. In etcd recov-
ery is slower: It can take up to 40 seconds for throughput to
return to its peak. e election mechanism in etcd is similar
to that of ZooKeeper [61], and the heartbeat parameters of
these two systems are similar as well (1 and 2 seconds, re-
spectively). e dierence in stability between ZooKeeper
and etcd can also stem from an engineering aspect, as the
former system has a more stable codebase (started in 2007)
compared with the laer system (2013).
For BFT-Smart, we allowed the system up to 120 seconds
to recover but throughput remained 0. We also tried with
smaller sizes, and found thatN = 88 is the largest size where
BFT-Smart manages to recover, aer roughly 10s. Finally,
we remark that we were able to reproduce all these behaviors
across multiple (at least 3) runs, so these are not outlying
cases.
5 Carousel Protocol
An interesting design aspect of Carousel is how the ring
overlay masks faults. We achieve this by keeping redun-
dant paths on this overlay, thus ensuring availability despite
faults or asynchrony. e agreement protocol of Carousel is
of interest as well, which is the FaB consensus algorithm [56]
adapted to a ring overlay.
We choose to paern the agreement protocol of Carousel
aer FaB [56] 2-step BFT consensus algorithm due to the
interesting tradeo this oers. FaB reduces the latency of
BFT agreement from three steps to two. is is appealing
in our ring topology, because each step is a complete traver-
sal of the ring. Fewer traversals means higher throughput,
lower latency, and a simpler protocol than 3-step ones [19].
is benet comes to the detriment of resilience: the system
needs larger quorums to tolerate faults. Carousel assumes
N = 5F +1 replicas, whereas optimal BFT systems tolerate
one-third faults, i.e., N = 3F +1 [19]. As in prior solutions,9
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our agreement protocol relies on the existence of a sequencer
(i.e., a leader) assigning sequence numbers to operations.
Figure 4 shows an overview of Carousel when N = 6.
e replicas, labeled 0...5, are organized on a ring. Note that
each replica in this overlay has a certain successor and prede-
cessor replica. One of the replicas (node 0) is the sequencer.
By default, broadcast messages disseminate through the sys-
tem from one replica to its immediate successor. Addition-
ally, fallback (redundant) paths exist, to ensure availability
despite asynchrony or faults.
e interface of Carousel is log-based: Each replica ex-
poses a simple API which allows clients to read from a
totally-ordered log and to Append new entries to this log.
Under this API layer, all replicas implement a reliable broad-
cast primitive providing high throughput and availability.
We discuss the Append operation rst (§5.1), then the reli-
able broadcast layer (§5.2), followed by the reconguration
sub-protocol (§5.3) and correctness arguments (§5.4).
5.1 Append Operation
To add an entry e to the totally-ordered log, clients invoke
Append(e) at any replica i. e operation proceeds in two
logical phases:
1. Data—Replica i broadcasts entry e to all correct replicas
using RingBroadcast of the underlying broadcast layer.
2. Agreement—A BFT agreement protocol executes. e
sequencer proposes a sequence number (i.e., a log posi-
tion) for entry e, and correct replicas conrm this pro-
posal. Aer executing the agreement phase for this
entry, replica i noties the client that the operation suc-
ceeded.
Listing 1 shows the implementation of the Append op-
eration. First, replica i broadcasts a 〈DATA, e〉 message, as
shown on line 2. is corresponds to the rst logical phase
of the Append operation. We say that this broadcast message
is of type data and has payload e. As this message dissem-
1 func Append(e):
2 RingBroadcast(〈DATA, e〉) // Broadcast data message with
payload ’e’
4 callback RingDeliver(id, 〈type, payload〉):
5 if (type == DATA):
6 pending[id].entry = payload
7 proposeAgreementMsg(id, payload) // Executes ONLY at
sequencer
8 else if (type == AGREEMENT):
9 handleAgreementMsg(payload) // e payload is a triplet
11 // Executes ONLY at the sequencer
12 func proposeAgreementMsg(id, e):
13 hash = Hash(nextSeqNr . id . e)
14 // Disseminate the agreement message
15 RingBroadcast(〈AGREEMENT, nextSeqNr++, id, hash〉)
17 func handleAgreementMsg(sn, id, hash):
18 validate(sn, id, hash) || return
19 pending[id].sn = sn
20 pending[id].hash = hash
21 pending[id].confirmations++
22 // Disseminate our own conrmation for this sequence number
23 RingBroadcast(〈AGREEMENT, sn, id, hash〉)
24 if (pending[id].confirmations == 4F+1):
25 addToStableLog(id)
Listing 1: A high-level algorithm describing the Append
operation.
inates throughout the system, each correct replica triggers
the RingDeliver callback to deliver the data message (line 4
of Listing 1).
e delivery callback always provides two arguments: (1)
an identier id, and (2) the actual message. e underlying
broadcast layer assigns the id, which uniquely identies the
associated message. We discuss identiers in further detail
later, but suce to say that an identier is a pair denoting the
replica which sent the corresponding message plus a logical
timestamp for that replica (§5.2). e actual message, in this
case, is a data message with payload entry e. Upon delivery
of any data message, each correct replica stores this entry in
a pending set. Note that this set is indexed by the assigned
id (line 6).
e agreement phase starts when the sequencer replica de-
livers the data message with e. Aer saving e in the pending
set, the sequencer also proposes a sequence number for e by
broadcasting a 〈AGREEMENT, sn, id, hash〉 message (line 7
and lines 12–15). It would be wasteful (in terms of band-
width) to include the whole entry in this agreement message;
instead, the sequencer simply pairs the entry id with a mono-
tonically increasing sequence number sn (called nextSeqNr
on line 15). e hash in the agreement message is computed
on the concatenation of the assigned sequence number, the
entry id, and the entry e itself.
Each replica delivers the agreement message of the se-
quencer trough the same RingDeliver callback of the broad-10
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Figure 5: e unfolding of an Append(e) operation in Carousel.
e client contacts replica 4, which broadcasts a data message.
Once this message reaches the sequencer (replica 0), this replica
broadcasts an agreement message. en all replicas broadcast
their agreement message. Entry e becomes stable once a replica
gathers at least 4F + 1 = 5 matching agreement messages for e.
cast layer. Aer any replica j delivers the agreement mes-
sage, then j broadcasts its own agreement message with the
same triplet (sn, id, hash), as described on line 23. Prior to
doing so, replica j validates the hash and saves the assigned
sequence number and hash in the pending log (lines 17–20).
e validation step (line 18) refers to several important
checks: that the hash correctly matches the sequence num-
ber sn, identier id, and entry content; that this id has no
other proposal for a prior sequence number; that each num-
ber sn in an agreement message has a corresponding pro-
posal for that sn from the sequencer replica; and that dier-
ent agreement messages conrming the same sn originate
from distinct replicas.
We say that a replica commits on log entry e aer it gath-
ers sucient (4F + 1) conrmations for that entry. e
entry then becomes stable at that replica (line 25). By the re-
liability of the RingBroadcast dissemination primitive, if the
sequencer is correct and proposes a valid sn, then the entry
eventually becomes stable at all correct replicas. As proved
in prior work [56], this protocol has optimal resilience for
two-step BFT agreement, i.e., N = 5F + 1 is the smallest
system size to tolerate F faults with two-step agreement.
Informally, as the initial agreement message (from the
sequencer) propagates on the ring, it produces a snowball ef-
fect: Each replica delivering this message broadcasts its own
agreement message, conrming the proposed sequence num-
ber. Figure 5 depicts this intuition. Notice that the data and
agreement phases partially overlap (beginning from replica
0). Overall, it takes N+2 message delays for replica 4 to re-
spond to the client request. In terms of message complexity,
each replica processesN+1 messages. In other words, there
are N+1 total invocations to RingBroadcast: one with the
data message, plus N agreement messages (one per replica).
5.2 Reliable Broadcast in a Ring Topology
In a conventional ring-based broadcast, each replica i ex-
pects its predecessor i-1 to forward each message which i-1
delivers [37, 44]. Messages travel from every replica to that
replica’s successor. Intuitively, this scheme is throughput-
optimal because it balances the burden of data dissemina-
tion across all replicas [37]; the downside, however, is that
asynchrony (or fault) at any replica can aect availability
by impeding progress. To maintain high-throughput broad-
cast across the ring overlay despite asynchrony or faults,
in Carousel we strengthen the ring so that each replica con-
nects withF+1 total predecessors. A replica has one default
connection—with the immediate predecessor—and up to F
fallback connections—with increasingly distant predeces-
sors. e topology we obtain is essentially an F -connected
graph. is graph ensures connectedness (availability) de-
spite up to F faults.
In Figure 4 for instance, replica 4 should obtain from
replica 3 all messages circulating in the system. If replica 3
disrupts dissemination and drops messages, however, then
replica 4 can activate the fallback connection to replica 2.
By default, communication on this fallback path is restricted
to brief messages called state vectors, which replica 2 period-
ically sends directly to replica 4.
More generally, replica i expects a state vector from all
F of its fallback predecessors, i.e., from replicas i-2, i-3, ....
A state vector is a concise representation of all messages
delivered by the corresponding fallback replica. If replica i
notices that its immediate predecessor i-1 is omiing mes-
sages (and that the state on fallback replica i-2 is steadily
growing), then i sends a 〈ACTIVATE, svi〉 message directly to
replica i-2, where svi is the state vector of replica i.
Replica i-2 interprets the activate message by sending to
replica i all messages which i-2 has delivered and are not
part of state vector svi. ereaer, replica i-2 continues
sending to i any new messages it delivers. In the meantime,
replica i-2 also continues forwarding messages as usual to its
immediate successor replica i-1. In case replica i-1 restarts
acting correctly and forwards messages to i, then replica i
can send a 〈DEACTIVATE〉 message to i-2.
Alternatively, replica i can request individual pieces of
the state from i-2, e.g., in case replica i-1 is selectively with-
holding messages from i. Since every replica has F +1 total
connections, Carousel can tolerate up to F faults, regardless
whether these faults are successive on the ring or dispersed
across the system. is mechanism based on fallback con-
nections is strictly to improve availability (i.e., delivery of
broadcast messages) relying on timeouts, but does not aect
the safety of the protocol (§5.4).
e state vector svi at some replica i is a vector of times-
tamps with one element per replica. e element on position
j denotes the latest message broadcast by replica j which
replica i delivered. Concretely, each such element is a times-11
tamp, i.e., a logical counter aached to any message which
a replica sends upon invoking RingBroadcast. For instance,
whenever replica j calls RingBroadcast(m), the broadcast
layer tags message m with a unique id, in the form of a pair
{j, ts}, where j denotes the sender replica and ts is a mono-
tonically increasing timestamp specic to replica j. 2 As we
explained earlier, the id also plays an important role in the
Append operation (§5.1).
When replica i delivers message m with id {j, ts} from
replica j via the RingDeliver callback, replica i updates its
state vector svi to reect timestamp ts for position j. Sta-
tus vectors are inspired from vector clocks [29, 57]. e
notable dierence to vector clocks is that a replica does not
increment its own timestamp when delivering or forward-
ing a message: is timestamp increments only when a
replica sends a new message—typically a data or a agree-
ment message—by invoking RingBroadcast. With state vec-
tors, our goal is not to track causality or impose an order [37],
but to ensure no messages are lost (i.e., reliability).
One corner-case that can appear in our protocol is when
a malicious sender replica aempts to stir confusion using
incorrect timestamps. In particular, such a replica i can at-
tach the same timestamp to two dierent messages: m1 with
{i, ts1} andm2 with id {i, ts1}. Another bad paern is skip-
ping a step in the timestamp by broadcasting rst {i, ts1}
and then {i, ts3}. In practice, communication between any
two replicas relies on FIFO links (e.g., TCP), so correct repli-
cas can simply disallow—as a rule—gaps or duplicates in mes-
sages they deliver.
FIFO links, however, do not entirely x the earlier prob-
lem. It is possible that some replica delivers m1 with times-
tamp ts1, while a dierent replica delivers m2 for this same
timestamp. But note that this will not cause safety issues.
e replicas can only agree on either of m1 or m2: When
the sequencer proposes a sequence number for id {i, ts1}, it
also includes a hash of the corresponding message, eitherm1
or m2. Even if the sequencer is incorrect and proposes se-
quence numbers for bothm1 andm2 (a poisonous write [56])
only one of these two messages can gather a quorum and
become stable. To conclude, timestamps restrict accept-
able behavior and—when coupled with the sender replica’s
identity—provide a unique identier for all messages circu-
lating in the system, which helps ensure reliability.
5.3 Reconguration
e reconguration sub-protocol in Carousel ensures live-
ness when the sequencer replica misbehaves. is proto-
col is, informally, an adaptation of the FaB [56] recovery
mechanism (which is designed for an individual instance of
2Just like sequence numbers, timestamps are dense [19]: is prevents
replicas from exhausting the space of these numbers and makes communi-
cation steps more predictable, which simplies dealing with faulty behav-
ior [7].
consensus) to state machine replication.
5.3.1 Preliminaries
Reconguration concerns the agreement algorithm in
Carousel. Neither the data phase (of the Append opera-
tion) nor the broadcast layer need to change. We adjust the
common-case protocol of §5.1 to accommodate recongura-
tion as follows:
1. Replicas no longer agree on a sequence number
sn for every Append operation. Instead, each in-
stance of the agreement protocol for a given sequence
number is tagged with a conguration number, so
that replicas now agree on a tuple {cn, sn}. In
other words, agreement messages now have the form
〈AGREEMENT, {cn, sn}, id, hash〉. e concept of pro-
posal numbers in FaB [56] or that of view numbers in
PBFT [19] is analogous to conguration numbers in
Carousel; briey, these serve the purpose of tracking
the number of times the sequencer changes.
2. We modify the hash in agreement messages to also
include the conguration number.
3. Our common-case protocol assumes that, for every se-
quence number sn, a replica only ever accepts (i.e.,
gives its vote for) a single agreement message, namely,
the rst valid agreement message they deliver for that
sn from the sequencer. To account for conguration
numbers, a replica is now allowed to change its mind,
and accept another agreement message if the sequencer
changed (i.e., in a dierent conguration number).
Conguration numbers in Carousel start from 0. Every
time the conguration number increases, the sequencer role
changes deterministically, so that the new sequencer is the
successor of the previous sequencer, in a round robin man-
ner.
We note that the ring-based dissemination algorithm
(§5.2) that replicas employ during common-case requires no
modications. While executing reconguration (described
next), however, replicas do not use the ring-based broadcast
primitive. If reconguration is executing, this means that
the current sequencer is faulty and hence the system is ex-
periencing no progress. For this reason, we can temporarily
renounce on the high-throughput broadcast enabled by the
ring topology, and adopt instead a conventional all-to-all
broadcast scheme towards optimizing for latency.
5.3.2 Protocol
A correct replica i enters the reconguration sub-protocol if
any of the following conditions hold: (1) a timer expires at
replica i because the sequencer replica failed to create new
agreement messages or a previous reconguration failed to
complete in a timely manner, or (2) replica i observes F + 1
other replicas proposing reconguration.12
To propose a reconguration and change the sequencer,
replica i broadcasts a 〈RECONF, i, cn, P〉 message. Once it
does so, replica i also starts ignoring any messages concern-
ing conguration number cn or lower, and until recong-
uration completes it ignores any messages except those of
type data, reconguration, or new-conguration (as we de-
ne them below). Replica i also starts a timer to prevent a
stalling reconguration.
e set P in a reconguration message contains agree-
ment messages which replica i signed for all the sequence
numbers which are still pending at this replica. In other
words, these are proposals for entries which are not part of
the stable log at replica i because this replica gathered in-
sucient conrmations (i.e., less than 4F + 1) to mark the
corresponding entry as stable.
e successor of the faulty (old) sequencer, namely the
replica at position cn′ on the ring, where cn′ = (cn+1)%N ,
is set to become sequencer when reconguration completes.
is new sequencer waits until it gathers reconguration
messages from 4F + 1 replicas, including itself, and then
broadcasts a 〈NEWCONF, cn+ 1,R〉 message. Here,R repre-
sents the set of 4F + 1 reconguration messages which the
new sequencer gathered.
Reconguration completes at replica i when i delivers
the new-conguration message. When this happens, replica
i starts accepting agreement messages created by the new
sequencer (i.e., the replica at position cn′ on the ring) and ex-
pects these messages to be tagged with conguration num-
ber cn + 1. Aer reconguration completes, the new se-
quencer starts redoing the common-case agreement protocol
for every individual sequence number found in an agreement
message in the setR.
For every sequence number sn appearing in R, the new
sequencer creates a new agreement message with the con-
guration number set to cn + 1. When creating these new
agreement messages, for every sequence number sn there
are two cases to consider:
(1) If there exists an id that appears in an agreement mes-
sage ofR, such that there is no id′ 6= id with 2F + 1 agree-
ment messages (with the same sn) in R, then the new se-
quencer chooses this id to be associated to sn in the new
agreement message. e new sequencer also recomputes
the hash as done in the common-case protocol, including the
new conguration number cn+ 1. In FaB terminology [56],
we say that the set R of reconguration messages vouches
for id to be associated to sn.
(2) Alternatively, it can happen that more than one pair
(sn, id) is vouched for byR (or no such pair at all). is can
occur, for instance, if the previous sequencer was malicious
and proposed for the same sequence number snmultiple dif-
ferent ids. In this case, the sequencer can choose to associate
sn with any id that was previously proposed for sn, and re-
computes the hash as done in the common-case. For every
such new agreement message that the new sequencer cre-
ates, the common-case protocol executes as described in §5.1,
accounting for the conguration number cn+ 1.
5.4 Correctness Arguments
Safety. Carousel provides three safety guarantees. (1) Only
values (i.e., entry ids) that are proposed by replicas can be-
come stable; (2) Per sequence number, only one value can
become stable; (3) e same value cannot become stable at
two dierent sequence numbers.
Recall that the agreement algorithm in Carousel is pat-
terned aer the FaB protocol. Specically, we rely on the cor-
rectness of this protocol, so properties (1) and (2) follow from
the safety properties of FaB (CS1 and CS2, respectively) [56,
§5.4].
Property (3) follows from the fact that correct replicas
index values by their identier id (see lines 6 and 19 in List-
ing 1); hence each value will be associated to a unique se-
quence number, and no correct replica will accept or con-
rm any value that was previously proposed for a dierent
sequence number.
Liveness.Our system ensures the following liveness proper-
ties. (1) at any point in time, if there exists a value proposed
by a correct replica which is not part of the stable log yet,
then eventually one value (possibly another one) will be-
come stable, (2) if there are only a nite number of proposed
values, then all of them eventually become stable.
(1) Assume there is a value v (entry id) which is not part
of the stable log yet. Let sn be the rst sequence number
for which no value was accepted. If the current sequencer
is correct, then it will propose a unique value for sequence
number sn (either value v, or another one), and the replicas
will reach agreement on that value.
If the replicas are not able to eventually reach agreement
for sequence number sn, this means that the current se-
quencer is faulty, and they will trigger a reconguration. e
new sequencer might be faulty as well, but aer enough re-
congurations (at most F ), a correct sequencer is chosen.
is new sequencer will then propose a unique value for se-
quence number sn that will become accepted by all (correct)
replicas, and accepted to the stable log.
(2) We apply the rst liveness property as many times as
there are proposed values. Together with safety, this ensures
that every operation that needs to be ordered eventually be-
comes stable.
6 Discussion & Related Work
Several strongly-consistent systems, including those based
on chain- or ring-replication, have been designed assum-
ing a synchronous system model with uniform replica and
network characteristics [12, 47, 84]. By using an ecient
communication paern (i.e, load-balancing the agreement13
algorithm) these systems exhibit the best performance de-
cay. ese protocols seem to excel in synchronous mod-
els [37]—and forfeit availability otherwise. In a WAN (or
multi-datacenter), uniformity or synchrony is unlikely. We
introduce the Carousel protocol as a rst step in trying to
bridge the gap between good performance decay and good
availability.
We remark on two concrete research directions to help
further the goal of reconciling performance decay and avail-
ability in agreement protocols. First, it is appealing to com-
bine broadcast with ring-based protocols in a single system,
in the vein of Abstract [12]. Such a system could provide
higher BFT resilience, namely tolerate F = b(N − 1)/3c
faults, unlike Carousel where resilience is F = b(N−1)/5c.
Combining protocols typically yields intricate systems, how-
ever, and it is important to address the resulting complex-
ity. Second, for predictable behavior, faulty nodes should
be detected and evicted from the system in a timely man-
ner. is is challenging in a Byzantine environment. Past
approaches rely on proofs-of-misbehavior (which are useful
for limited kinds of faults [50]) or on incentives (which tend
to be complex [7]), so new solutions or practical assumptions
are needed.
Chain- or ring-replication is a well-studied scheme in
SMR. Our baseline, Chain, is a straightforward implemen-
tation of chain replication in the fail-stop model, shedding
light on what is an ideal upper bound of SMR throughput in
fault-free executions. In contrast to Carousel, previous ap-
proaches consider a model that does not tolerate Byzantine
faults [8, 10, 44], or they degrade to a broadcast algorithm
to cope with such faults [12, 47].
e technique of overlapping groups of chain replication
on a ring topology, as employed in FAWN [10], is similar to
basic ring-based replication. e insight is similar: instead
of absorbing all client operations through a single node (a
boleneck), accept operations at multiple nodes. e most
important distinction between FAWN and Carousel lies in
the use of sharding. FAWN shards the application state, each
shard mapping to a chain replication group. As we men-
tioned earlier, sharding is a common workaround to scale
SMR [16, 33, 23]. In Carousel and other systems we study,
the goal is full replication. Even when sharding is employed,
our ndings are valuable because they apply to the intra-
shard protocol (which is typically an SMR instance).
S-Paxos [17] decouples request dissemination from re-
quest ordering. is relaxes the load at leader and can in-
crease throughput. We apply this same principle in Carousel,
by separating dissemination (ring-based broadcast for high
throughput) from agreement (FaB). In contrast to Carousel,
S-Paxos does not tolerate Byzantine faults.
Building upon a conjecture of Lamport [52], FaB [56] laid
the fundamental groundwork for 2-step BFT consensus. e
agreement algorithm in Carousel is a simplied FaB protocol
(e.g., we use only one type of protocol message, SEQUENCE,
for reaching agreement), but the most important distinc-
tion to FaB is that Carousel employs a ring topology in the
common-case, eschewing the throughput boleneck at the
leader. We believe the FaB agreement algorithm combined
with dissemination schemes from the chain- or ring-based
families [37, 44, 84] deserve more aention.
It was recently uncovered that a version of the FaB pro-
tocol is awed. Namely, that this protocol version suers
from liveness issues, which can happen when a malicious
leader engages in a poisonous write [2]. is problem, how-
ever, only applies specically to the parametrized version of
FaB [56], called PFaB in [2]. PFaB is not the same protocol
as the one we use in Carousel, hence Carousel is not subject
to the liveness problems of PFaB.
It is dicult—if not impossible—to be comprehensive in
studying agreement protocols, given the abundance of work
on this topic. In choosing the ve systems in this paper, our
goal was to include solutions that are as diverse as possible
in their design while also being broadly applicable. Many
interesting agreement protocols exist that build on various
assumptions to speed performance and allay their through-
put decay, for instance by relying on correct client behav-
ior as in Zyzzyva [50], exploit application semantics as in
EPaxos [60], considering certain restricted data types as in
the Q/U protocol [1], or client speculation [87].
Our stability experiments show that BFT SMR protocols,
even as mature as BFT-Smart, are not as bale-tested as
CFT protocols. Indeed, open-source implementations of BFT
SMR are scarce, and the issue of non-fault-tolerant BFT pro-
tocols is known [22]. In fact, it is a pleasant surprise for us
that BFT-Smart is able to go through reconguration at 88
replicas (despite folding at bigger system sizes), and resume
request execution aer the leader fails.
An important application of Byzantine fault-tolerant SMR
is for permissioned distributed ledger applications [11, 79].
In such an application, SMR can serve as an essential sub-
system ensuring a total-order across the entries in the ledger.
ere is a growing body of work dealing with the problem
of scaling consensus for distributed ledgers, which we cover
briey.
SBFT is a recent BFT system showing impressive perfor-
mance, e.g., at least 350 rps when F=64 (i.e., N=193) [34].
To obtain a scalable solution, this system explores modern
cryptographic tools (plus other optimizations), a design di-
mension we did not explore in this work. Another practical
method to scale agreement to a large set of nodes is to elect
a small commiee (or even one node), and run the agree-
ment protocol in this commiee. is method appears in
Algorand [32], HoneyBadger [58], ByzCoin [48], or Bitcoin-
NG [28], among others. Most research in this area seeks to
ensure probabilistic guarantees, whereas we consider deter-
ministic solutions. Nevertheless, our ndings in this paper
apply to most of these protocols, because typically the com-
miees in these systems run a deterministic protocol, e.g.,14
PBFT [19, 48].
A specic step that is common to all SMR protocols is the
processing of protocol messages and client requests at each
replica. Several approaches can optimize this step. ese are
all orthogonal to our study, and they generally apply to any
SMR system. Examples include optimistic execution to lever-
age multi-cores [46] or hardware-assisted solutions [72], e.g.,
to speed costly crypto computations, ooad protocol pro-
cessing [42], or using a trusted module to increase resilience
and simplify protocol design [21].
7 Conclusions
It is commonly believed that throughput in agreement pro-
tocols should degrade sharply with system size. e data
supporting this belief is scarce, however, and simple extrap-
olation cannot tell the whole story. Consequently, in this
paper we have studied empirically the performance decay
of agreement in ve SMR systems.
A positive takeaway from our study was that mature SMR
implementations (ZooKeeper, etcd, and BFT-Smart) can sus-
tain, out-of-the-box, 300–500 rps (requests per second) at
100 replicas. eir throughput decays rapidly at small scale
(consistent with previous ndings), but this decay dampens
at larger size. ese systems exhibit a non-linear (inversely
proportional) decay rate. roughput decays very slowly
(linearly) in chain-replication, and this system can sustain
11K rps at 100 replicas. Carousel comes within 60% per-
formance of the ideal (chain-replication). is suggests that
SMR can be eectively employed in mid-sized applications,
e.g., up to hundreds of replicas, and there should be more
focus on chain- or ring-based topologies for mitigating agree-
ment protocols performance decay.
References
[1] Abd-El-Malek, M. , Ganger, G. R. ,
Goodson, G. R. , Reiter, M. K. , and Wylie,
J . J . Fault-scalable Byzantine Fault-tolerant Services.
SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 39, 5 (2005), 59–74.
[2] Abraham, I . , Gueta, G. , Malkhi , D. , Alvisi ,
L . , Kotla, R. , and Martin, J . -P. Revisiting fast
practical byzantine fault tolerance. arxiv:2017 (2017).
[3] Abu-Libdeh, H. , van Renesse, R. , and
Vigfusson, Y. Leveraging Sharding in the Design
of Scalable Replication Protocols. In SOCC (2013).
[4] Adya, A. , Dunagan, J . , and Wolman, A.
Centrifuge: Integrated lease management and
partitioning for cloud services. In NSDI (2010).
[5] Agarwal, S . , Dunagan, J . , Jain, N. , Saroiu,
S . , Wolman, A. , and Bhogan, H. Volley:
Automated data placement for geo-distributed cloud
services. In NSDI (2010).
[6] Aguilera, M. K. , Keidar, I . , Malkhi , D. ,
and Shraer, A. Dynamic atomic storage without
consensus. J. ACM 58, 2 (2011), 7:1–7:32.
[7] Aiyer, A. S . , Alvisi , L . , Clement, A. ,
Dahlin, M. , Martin, J . -P. , and Porth, C.
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services. SIGOPS
Operating Systems Review 39, 5 (2005).
[8] Amir, Y. , Nita-Rotaru, C. , Stanton, S . , and
Tsudik, G. Secure spread: An integrated
architecture for secure group communication. IEEE
Transactions on dependable and secure computing 2, 3
(2005), 248–261.
[9] An, K. , Gokhale, A. , Tambe, S . , and
Kuroda, T. Wide area network-scale discovery and
data dissemination in data-centric publish/subscribe
systems. In Middleware (2015).
[10] Andersen, D. G. , Franklin, J . , Kaminsky,
M. , Phanishayee, A. , Tan, L. , and
Vasudevan, V. FAWN: A fast array of wimpy
nodes. In SOSP (2009).
[11] Androulaki , E . , Barger, A. , Bortnikov, V. ,
Cachin, C. , Christidis , K. , Caro, A. D. ,
Enyeart, D. , Ferris , C. , Laventman, G. ,
Manevich, Y. , Muralidharan, S . , Murthy,
C. , Nguyen, B. , Sethi , M. , Singh, G. , Smith,
K. , Sorniotti , A. , Stathakopoulou, C. ,
Vukolic , M. , Cocco, S . W. , and Yellick, J .
Hyperledger fabric: a distributed operating system for
permissioned blockchains. In Proceedings of the
irteenth EuroSys Conference, EuroSys 2018, Porto,
Portugal, April 23-26, 2018 (2018), pp. 30:1–30:15.
[12] Aublin, P.-L . , Guerraoui , R. , Knezˇevi c´ , N. ,
Q_ue´ma, V. , and Vukoli c´ , M. e Next 700 BFT
Protocols. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 32, 4 (2015).
[13] Baker, J . , Bond, C. , Corbett, J . C. , Furman,
J . , Khorlin, A. , Larson, J . , Leon, J . -M. , Li ,
Y. , Lloyd, A. , and Yushprakh, V. Megastore:
Providing scalable, highly available storage for
interactive services. In CIDR (2011).
[14] Becker, D. , Junqeira, F. , and Serafini , M.
Leader election for replicated services using
application scores. In Middleware (2011).
[15] Bessani , A. , Sousa, J . , and Alchieri , E . E .
State machine replication for the masses with
BFT-SMaRt. In IEEE/IFIP DSN (2014).15
[16] Bezerra, C. E. , and Pedone, F. Strong
Consistency at Scale. IEEE Data Engineering Bulletin
(2016).
[17] Biely, M. , Milosevic, Z. , Santos, N. , and
Schiper, A. S-Paxos: Ooading the Leader for
High roughput State Machine Replication. In SRDS
(2012).
[18] Brewer, E. Cap twelve years later: How the ”rules”
have changed. Computer 45, 2 (2012).
[19] Castro, M. , and Liskov, B. Practical byzantine
fault tolerance and proactive recovery. ACM
Transactions on Computer Systems 20, 4 (2002).
[20] Chandra, T. D. , Griesemer, R. , and
Redstone, J . Paxos made live: An engineering
perspective. In PODC (2007).
[21] Chun, B.-G. , Maniatis , P. , Shenker, S . , and
Kubiatowicz, J . Aested append-only memory.
In SOSP (2007).
[22] Clement, A. , Wong, E. L . , Alvisi , L . ,
Dahlin, M. , and Marchetti , M. Making
Byzantine Fault Tolerant Systems Tolerate Byzantine
Faults. In NSDI (2009).
[23] Corbett, J . C. , Dean, J . , Epstein, M. , Fikes ,
A. , Frost, C. , Furman, J . J . , Ghemawat, S . ,
Gubarev, A. , Heiser, C. , Hochschild, P. ,
Hsieh, W. , Kanthak, S . , Kogan, E. , Li , H. ,
Lloyd, A. , Melnik, S . , Mwaura, D. , Nagle,
D. , Q_uinlan, S . , Rao, R. , Rolig, L . , Saito, Y. ,
Szymaniak, M. , Taylor, C. , Wang, R. , and
Woodford, D. Spanner: Google’s globally
distributed database. ACM Transactions on Computer
Systems (TOCS) 31, 3 (2013).
[24] Cowling, J . , Myers, D. , Liskov, B. ,
Rodrigues, R. , and Shrira, L. HQ replication:
A hybrid quorum protocol for Byzantine fault
tolerance. In OSDI (2006).
[25] Croman, K. , Decker, C. , Eyal, I . , Gencer,
A. E. , Juels , A. , Kosba, A. E. , Miller, A. ,
Saxena, P. , Shi , E . , Sirer, E. G. , Song, D. ,
and Wattenhofer, R. On scaling decentralized
blockchains - (A position paper). In Financial
Cryptography and Data Security - FC 2016
International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and
WAHC, Christ Church, Barbados, February 26, 2016,
Revised Selected Papers (2016), pp. 106–125.
[26] Duan, S. , Reiter, M. K. , and Zhang, H.
BEAT: Asynchronous BFT Made Practical. In CCS
(2018).
[27] Dwork, C. , Lynch, N. A. , and Stockmeyer,
L . Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony.
JACM 35, 2 (Apr. 1988), 288–323.
[28] Eyal, I . , Gencer, A. E. , Sirer, E. G. , and
Van Renesse, R. Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable
Blockchain Protocol. In NSDI (2016).
[29] Fidge, C. J . Timestamps in message-passing
systems that preserve the partial ordering. In Proc. of
the 11th Australian Computer Science Conference
(ACSC’88) (1988).
[30] Fournier, C. Running zookeeper across regions,
2012. http://www.elidedbranches.com/2012/
12/building-global-highly-available.html.
[31] Ghemawat, S . , Gobioff, H. , and Leung,
S . -T. e Google File System. In SOSP (2003).
[32] Gilad, Y. , Hemo, R. , Micali , S . , Vlachos, G. ,
and Zeldovich, N. Algorand: Scaling byzantine
agreements for cryptocurrencies. In SOSP (2017).
[33] Glendenning, L. , Beschastnikh, I . ,
Krishnamurthy, A. , and Anderson, T.
Scalable Consistency in Scaer. In SOSP (2011).
[34] Golan Gueta, G. , Abraham, I . , Grossman,
S . , Malkhi , D. , Pinkas, B. , Reiter, M. K. ,
Seredinschi , D.-A. , Tamir, O. , and
Tomescu, A. SBFT: a Scalable and Decentralized
Trust Infrastructure. In IEEE/IFIP DSN (2019).
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.01626.pdf.
[35] Guerraoui , R. , Kermarrec, A.-M. ,
Pavlovic, M. , and Seredinschi , D.-A. Atum :
Scalable Group Communication Using Volatile Groups.
In Middleware (2016).
[36] Guerraoui , R. , Kuznetsov, P. , Monti , M. ,
Pavlovicˇ , M. , and Seredinschi , D.-A. e
consensus number of a cryptocurrency. In Proceedings
of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of
Distributed Computing (New York, NY, USA, 2019),
PODC ’19, ACM, pp. 307–316.
[37] Guerraoui , R. , Levy, R. R. , Pochon, B. , and
Q_ue´ma, V. roughput Optimal Total Order
Broadcast for Cluster Environments. ACM
Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) 28, 2 (2010).
[38] Guerraoui , R. , Pavlovic, M. , and
Seredinschi , D.-A. Incremental Consistency
Guarantees for Replicated Objects. In OSDI (2016).
[39] Gupta, S . A Non-Consensus Based Decentralized
Financial Transaction Processing Model with Support16
for Ecient Auditing. Master’s thesis, Arizona State
University, USA, 2016.
[40] Herlihy, M. , and Wing, J . M. Linearizability: A
correctness condition for concurrent objects. ACM
Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 12, 3 (1990), 463–492.
[41] Hunt, P. , Konar, M. , Junqeira, F. P. , and
Reed, B. Zookeeper: Wait-free coordination for
internet-scale systems. In USENIX ATC (2010).
[42] Istva´n, Z. , Sidler, D. , Alonso, G. , and
Vukolic, M. Consensus in a box: Inexpensive
coordination in hardware. In NSDI (2016).
[43] Jalili Marandi , P. , Benz, S . , Pedone, F. ,
and Birman, K. Practical experience report: e
performance of paxos in the cloud. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1404.6719 (2014).
[44] Jalili Marandi , P. , Primi , M. , Schiper, N. ,
and Pedone, F. Ring paxos: High-throughput
atomic broadcast. e Computer Journal 60, 6 (2017),
866–882.
[45] Junqeira, F. P. , Reed, B. C. , and Serafini ,
M. ZAB: High-performance broadcast for
primary-backup systems. In IEEE/IFIP DSN (2011).
[46] Kapritsos, M. , Wang, Y. , Q_uema, V. ,
Clement, A. , Alvisi , L . , and Dahlin, M. All
about Eve: execute-verify replication for multi-core
servers. In OSDI (2012).
[47] Knezevic, N. A High-roughput Byzantine
Fault-Tolerant Protocol. PhD thesis, IC/EPFL, 2012.
[48] Kogias, E. K. , Jovanovic, P. , Gailly, N. ,
Khoffi , I . , Gasser, L . , and Ford, B.
Enhancing bitcoin security and performance with
strong consistency via collective signing. In USENIX
Security (2016).
[49] Kokoris-Kogias, E . , Jovanovic, P. , Gasser,
L . , Gailly, N. , and Ford, B. OmniLedger: A
Secure, Scale-Out, Decentralized Ledger. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive 2017 (2017).
[50] Kotla, R. , Alvisi , L . , Dahlin, M. , Clement,
A. , and Wong, E. Zyzzyva: Speculative Byzantine
Fault Tolerance. SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 41,
6 (2007).
[51] Lamport, L. e part-time parliament. ACM TOCS
16, 2 (1998).
[52] Lamport, L. Lower bounds for asynchronous
consensus. In Future Directions in Distributed
Computing (2003).
[53] Lamport, L. , Shostak, R. , and Pease, M. e
byzantine generals problem. TOPLAS 4, 3 (1982),
382–401.
[54] Liu, S . , Viotti , P. , Cachin, C. , Q_ue´ma, V. ,
and Vukoli c´ , M. XFT: Practical Fault Tolerance
Beyond Crashes. In OSDI (2016).
[55] MacCormick, J . , Murphy, N. , Najork, M. ,
Thekkath, C. A. , and Zhou, L. Boxwood:
Abstractions as the foundation for storage
infrastructure. In OSDI (2004).
[56] Martin, J . P. , and Alvisi , L . Fast Byzantine
Consensus. In IEEE TDSC (2006).
[57] Mattern, F. Virtual time and global states of
distributed systems. In Proc. Workshop on Parallel and
Distributed Algorithms (1988).
[58] Miller, A. , Xia, Y. , Croman, K. , Shi , E . , and
Song, D. e honey badger of BFT protocols. In
CCS (2016).
[59] Mishra, S . , Peterson, L. L . , and
Schlichting, R. D. Consul: A communication
substrate for fault-tolerant distributed programs.
Distributed Systems Engineering 1, 2 (1993), 87.
[60] Moraru, I . , Andersen, D. G. , and
Kaminsky, M. ere is more consensus in
egalitarian parliaments. In SOSP (2013).
[61] Ongaro, D. Consensus: Bridging theory and practice.
PhD thesis, Stanford University, 2014.
[62] Ongaro, D. , and Ousterhout, J . In search of
an understandable consensus algorithm. In USENIX
ATC (2014).
[63] Online. B-SMaRt home page.
http://bft-smart.github.io/library/.
[64] Online. b-smart/library, commit 3af266d4 dated
Jul 12, 2016. https://github.com/bft-smart/
library/commit/3af266d4.
[65] Online. CoreOS/etcd.
https://coreos.com/etcd/.
[66] Online. etcd production users.
https://github.com/coreos/etcd/blob/
master/Documentation/production-users.md.
[67] Online. etcd/etcdserver/ra.go.
https://github.com/coreos/etcd/blob/
master/etcdserver/raft.go#L48.
[68] Online. Solayer.
http://www.softlayer.com/our-platform.17
[69] Online. Upstart: event-based init deamon.
http://upstart.ubuntu.com.
[70] Online. ZooKeeper (Ubuntu package),
high-performance coordination service for distributed
applications. http:
//packages.ubuntu.com/trusty/zookeeper.
[71] Online. Hyperledger Architecture, Volume 1,
August 2017. https://www.hyperledger.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/08/HyperLedger_
Arch_WG_Paper_1_Consensus.pdf.
[72] Poke, M. , and Hoefler, T. DARE:
High-Performance State Machine Replication on
RDMA Networks. In HPDC (2015).
[73] Porto, D. , Leita˜o, J . , Li , C. , Clement, A. ,
Kate, A. , Junqeira, F. P. , and Rodrigues,
R. Visigoth fault tolerance. In EuroSys (2015).
[74] Qiao, L. , Auradar, A. , Beaver, C. , Brandt,
G. , Gandhi, M. , Gopalakrishna, K. , Ip , W. ,
Jgadish, S . , Lu, S . , Pachev, A. , Ramesh, A. ,
Surlaker, K. , Sebastian, A. , Shanbhag, R. ,
Subramaniam, S . , Sun, Y. , Topiwala, S . ,
Tran, C. , Westerman, J . , Zhang, D. , Das, S . ,
Q_uiggle, T. , Schulman, B. , Ghosh, B. ,
Curtis , A. , Seeliger, O. , and Zhang, Z. On
Brewing Fresh Espresso: LinkedIns Distributed Data
Serving Platform. In SIGMOD (2013).
[75] Santos, N. , and Schiper, A. Tuning paxos for
high-throughput with batching and pipelining. In
International Conference on Distributed Computing and
Networking (2012), Springer, pp. 153–167.
[76] Shapiro, M. , Preguic¸a , N. , Baqero, C. ,
and Zawirski , M. Conict-free replicated data
types. In Stabilization, Safety, and Security of
Distributed Systems. Springer, 2011.
[77] Shraer, A. , Reed, B. , Malkhi , D. , and
Junqeira, F. P. Dynamic Reconguration of
Primary/Backup Clusters. In USENIX ATC (2012).
[78] Sousa, J . , and Bessani , A. Separating the
WHEAT from the Cha: An Empirical Design for
Geo-Replicated State Machines. In SRDS (2015).
[79] Sousa, J . , Bessani , A. , and Vukolic, M. A
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Ordering Service for the
Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Platform. In DSN
(2018).
[80] Tange, O. , et al. GNU parallel - e
Command-Line Power Tool. e USENIX Magazine 36,
1 (2011), 42–47.
[81] Team-Rocket. Snowake to Avalanche: A Novel
Metastable Consensus Protocol Family for
Cryptocurrencies. White Paper (2018). Revision:
05/16/2018 21:51:26 UTC.
[82] Van Renesse, R. , Ho, C. , and Schiper, N.
Byzantine chain replication. In OPODIS (2012).
[83] Van Renesse, R. , Schiper, N. , and
Schneider, F. B. Vive la die´rence: Paxos vs.
Viewstamped Replication vs. ZAB. IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing 12, 4 (2015),
472–484.
[84] Van Renesse, R. , and Schneider, F. B. Chain
replication for supporting high throughput and
availability. In OSDI (2004).
[85] Vogels , W. Eventually consistent. Commun. ACM
52, 1 (2009), 40–44.
[86] Vukoli c´ , M. e Quest for Scalable Blockchain
Fabric: Proof-of-work vs. BFT Replication. In
International Workshop on Open Problems in Network
Security (2015), Springer, pp. 112–125.
[87] Wester, B. , Cowling, J . , Nightingale,
E. B. , Chen, P. M. , Flinn, J . , and Liskov, B.
Tolerating latency in replicated state machines
through client speculation. In NSDI (2009).
[88] Wu, Z. , Butkiewicz, M. , Perkins, D. ,
Katz-Bassett, E. , and Madhyastha, H. V.
Spanstore: Cost-eective geo-replicated storage
spanning multiple cloud services. In SOSP (2013).
18
